​Introduction:
 
The purpose of this article is examine the Salvadoran repatriation process and how the government tracks its citizens.  In immigration hearings, the U.S. government regularly asserts that respondents who are threatened by gangs can relocate to other areas of El Salvador, obtain jobs, and function normally without detection.   However, there are a number of mechanisms the Salvadoran government uses in order to know where its citizens live.  Given that the Salvadoran bureaucracy has been compromised by officials under the pay of gangs or been infiltrated by gang members themselves, gangs can use these same databases to track persons of interest and continue to threaten them.   It is highly probable, therefore, that no person can prevent gangs finding out where they live in the long term.
 
 
Repatriation Process:
 
When a Salvadoran is repatriated, they fall under local repatriation arrangements signed by both U.S. and Salvadoran government officials designed to strengthen the bilateral framework for the protection of Salvadoran citizens being returned to El Salvador, improve the efficient use of limited resources, and increase coordination during the repatriation process.  Before or during the repatriation, the Department of Homeland Security provides El Salvador a list of the persons to be repatriated and pertinent information on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Form I-216. [1]
 
When individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses are being repatriated through formal immigration proceedings, information added includes alias, convictions and dates, and time served.  In addition, Salvadoran officials have web access to the U.S. Criminal History
Information Sharing (CHIS)  which includes  biometric information (photographs and fingerprints). DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) stores fingerprints on behalf of DHS component agencies which can be readily accessed by Salvadoran authorities. Note that the CHIS applies to both criminal and non-criminaldeportees.  In a previous article, we examined the CHIS in more detail [2].
 
Therefore, when a repatriated citizen is returned, Salvadoran authorities have a good deal of information on each person.   This data is augmented by several necessary disclosures each returnee must do in order to move throughout the country, hold a job, or drive a vehicle.
 
Identification:
 
Salvadoran citizens must have some sort of identification. Recent deportees can carry a U.S. identification such as a state drivers license. Nevertheless, U.S. identification are not accepted for most transactions.  TheDocumento Único de Identidad, or DUI as it is commonly known,is the most widely used form of identification in El Salvador.   It is essentially a voter registration card. One needs a Documento Único de Identidadto open a bank account, to apply for a job, and for employment.   Proof of address is required—a receipt of telephone, electricity, bank, school or other public or private services. [3]
 
 
Driver’s License:
 
Obtaining a driver’s license in El Salvador is separate from the DUI application. Once approved to drive, the driver is put into a central database to monitor traffic-related activities.   This information is shared by the Salvadoran Departments of Interior, Transport and Finance.   All drivers are issued a license the size of a credit card with embedded software. Data includes identity, vehicle registration status, type of license, vehicle tax data and history of traffic violations as well as biometric information. [4]
 
 
Conclusion:
 
The point of this article is to show that repatriated Salvadoran citizens are effectively tracked by their government from documents and CHIS data given to it by U.S. authorities, to registering for national identification and driver licensure.   At each point, a residential address must be given.  This information is stored by Salvadoran authorities which allows them to know the location of each of their citizens.
 
As noted earlier, during deportation hearings, respondents are regularly asked by the U.S. government about their ability to hide or find employment in other areas of El Salvador and thus avoid gang detection.  Unfortunately, Salvadoran law enforcement and government officials operate under the mandate of take a bribe or take a bullet in regard to gangs.   This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the gangs.  Gangs can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to obtain addresses or other information from persons of interest from government databases. There are also gang members that are members of the security forces and other government agencies that can compromise these databases. 
 
This leaves repatriated Salvadorans who fear gangs having to drop out of society in order to stay safe—meaning having no government identification, the ability to obtain good paying work, operate a motor vehicle, or access other essential public services. Thus, for those repatriated Salvadorans who want to reintegrate into society and lead normal lives, they leave themselves open to detection from the same gangs they fear.
 
 
Endnotes:
 
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Detainee Transfers,” December 2016, accessed at:  https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/7-4.pdf
 
[2] Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda, “The U.S. Criminal History Information Sharing Program and El Salvador’s Decree 717,” May 30, 2018, accessed at: http://discuss.ilw.com/showthread.php?44519-Article-The-U-S-Criminal-History-Information-Sharing-Program-and-El-Salvador%92s-Decree-717-By-Robert-Kirkland-and-Duncan-Breda&highlight=kirkland
 
[3] DUI El Salvador,” Government of El Salvador, Accessed at:  http://www.dui.gob.sv
[4] El Salvador’s Smart Driver’s License and Vehicle Registration Card,”  Genmalto Corporation, Accessed at:  https://www.gemalto.com/brochures-site/download-site/Documents/gov-el-salvador.pdf
 

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Interpol Red Notice process and its potential for abuse by Mexican and Central American authorities under the influence of drug cartels or gangs.  There is evidence that cartels and gangs have used the Interpol Red Notice system to falsely arrest persons of interest in the United States, ultimately having them removed by the U.S. immigration system back to their country of origin.  Once repatriated, these person become targets of retribution by cartels and gangs.  The abuse of the Red Notices system has been highlighted recently in the cases of Azerbaijan, China, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela—all authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian governments who use the Interpol system to punish political dissidents. Less noted or discussed are these Central American and Mexican cases where the law enforcement arm has been infiltrated by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) such as cartels and gangs.  Here the abuse of the Red Notice system is as much a concern as in China or Russia.
What are Interpol Red Notices?
Interpol Red Notices are international warrants for deportation and prosecution for crimes committed within another country which has bilateral extradition treaties between that country and the country in which the fugitive resides. Essentially a Red Notice lets one country signal to all other Interpol members (every country except North Korea) that it wants a person arrested with an eye to extradition. The Red Notice is not an arrest warrant—police forces do not have to obey it—but based on the types of crimes either suspected of or committed by the wanted fugitive, police have the prerogative to detain and extradite the fugitive. The originating country provides information to Interpol’s General Secretariat which evaluates the information provided by the originating country and conducts a compliance check.  Using Interpol’s criteria of “justifiable necessity,” it issues the warrant to police forces around the world to request to apprehend and extradite the wanted fugitive [1]. 
Potential for Abuse
The use of Interpol Red Notices have skyrocketed since 2009 when the checks and balances on notices were eased-- increasing the likelihood that some of these notices are being issued in bad faith. Ted Bromund, an expert on Interpol, states that Interpol has far more notices than it can realistically vet, that abuse is rife and is “the equivalent of Genghis Khan with a telegraph.” [2] 
Law enforcement and government officials in Mexico and Central America operate under the mandate of “silver or lead” (plata o plomo) -- basically take a bribe or take a bullet in regards to TCOs. This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the TCOs. Cartel bribes often times greatly exceed monthly salaries. Thus, TCOs can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to conduct a variety of law enforcement actions to include issuing bad faith Interpol Red Notices for arrest and extradition of persons of interest.  In effect, this gives TCOs ability to extend their power to threaten with arrest and removal persons of interest well beyond their home country.
 Conclusion
In the vast majority of cases, Interpol Red Notices serve an important role in detaining and extraditing wanted criminals back to their country of origin.  Nevertheless, there is also great potential for abuse of Interpol Red Notices and a review of Red Notice procedure has yet to be adopted.   There is justifiable concern that the Red Notice system is being abused by Mexico and Central American countries under the influence of TCOs to arbitrarily arrest and deport Mexican and Central American nationals residing in the United States. Mexican and Central Americans flee their home countries (often to the United States) in order to escape drug cartel or gang threats.  With the Interpol Red Notice, TCOs have a potent weapon to threaten persons of interest with arrests and removals well beyond their home country.
References
[1] “18 U.S. Code § 3181 - Scope and Limitation of Chapter.” LII / Legal Information Institute, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3181; “Red Notices.” Types of Human Trafficking / Trafficking in Human Beings / Crime Areas / Internet / Home - INTERPOL, www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices/Red-Notices.
[2]  “Russia’s latest attempt to arrest Bill Browder shows how autocracies abuse Interpol,”  Quartz, October 27, 2017.  Accessed at: https://qz.com/1112864/russia-and-bill-browder-how-autocracies-abuse-interpol/
See also: Goldstein, Joseph, and Benjamin Weiser. “After 78 Killings, a Honduran Drug Lord Partners With the U.S.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Oct. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/world/americas/after-78-killings-a-honduran-drug-lord-rivera-partners-with-us.html.