​Introduction:
 
Similar to the previous articles on the repatriation process in El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico [1], this article looks at the Guatemalan repatriation process and how that government tracks its citizens.  In immigration hearings, the U.S. government regularly asserts that respondents who are threatened by gangs can relocate to other areas of, obtain jobs, and function normally without detection.   Nevertheless, there are a number of mechanisms the Guatemalan government uses in order to know where its citizens live.  Given that the Guatemalan bureaucracy has been compromised by officials under the pay of gangs or been infiltrated by gang members themselves, gangs can use these same databases to track persons of interest and continue to threaten them.   It is highly probable, therefore, that no person can prevent gangs finding out where they live in the long term.
 
 
Repatriation Process:
 
When a repatriated citizen is returned to Guatemala, authorities have a good deal of information on each person through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Form I-216 and the U.S. Criminal History
Information Sharing (CHIS) agreement. For brevity sake, the previous articles in this series have discussed the DHS Form I-216 and the CHIS in more detail [2] [3].   The DHS and CHIS information is augmented by several necessary disclosures each returnee must do in order to move throughout Guatemala, hold a job, or drive a vehicle.
 
Identification:
 
Guatemalan citizens must have some sort of identification.  Recent deportees can carry a U.S. identification such as a state driver’s license. Nevertheless, U.S. identification are not accepted for most transactions. The Documento Personal de Identificacion or DPI as it is commonly known, is the most widely used form of identification in Guatemala.  The National Population Registry started implementing a state-of-the-art identity card in 2014.  This includes an automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and facial recognition biometrics.   When a Guatemalan citizen enrolls in the program, two fingerprints are taken and a faceprint is made using advanced facial recognition software.[4]


 
Driver’s License:
 
Obtaining a driver’s license in Guatemala is separate from the application for the DPI.  Maycom, a government entity, manages all drivers licensing across Guatemala.  Once approved to drive, the driver is put into a central database to monitor traffic-related activities.  The driver's license must be renewed every year. One-year costs 100 quetzals.  During initial licensing and renewals, proof of current address as well as the DPI must be presented.[5]
 
Utility Companies:
 
There are three large electric companies in Guatemala:
 

• EEGSA, which serves the departments of Guatemala, including Guatemala City, Sacatepéquez, Escuintla, Chimaltenango, Jalapa and Santa Rosa. 
• DEOCSA, which serves the south-western region of the country. 
• DEORSA, which serves the northern and eastern regions of the country.

 
Like other utilities such as the telephone company, these utility companies track those who pay for their services.  They have a database of names and addresses of their customers and regularly update their customer lists in order to efficiently collect outstanding payments [6].
 
Conclusion:
 
The point of this article is to show that repatriated Guatemalan citizens are effectively tracked by their government from documents and CHIS data given to it by U.S. authorities, to registering for national identification, driver licensure, and utility usage.   At each point, a residential address must be given.  This information is stored by Guatemalan authorities which allows them to know the location of each of their citizens.  
 
As noted earlier, during deportation hearings, respondents are regularly asked by the U.S. government about their ability to hide or find employment in other areas of Guatemala and thus avoid gang detection.  Gangs can co-opt government, law enforcement officials, or utility company employees to obtain addresses or other information from persons of interest.  
 
This leaves repatriated Guatemalans who fear gangs having to drop out of society in order to stay safe—meaning having no government identification, the ability to obtain good paying work, operate a motor vehicle, or direct access to utilities such as electricity or telephone.  Thus, for those repatriated Guatemalans who want to reintegrate into society and lead normal lives, they leave themselves open to detection from the same gangs they fear.
 
 
Endnotes:
 
[1] The following are the links to the three previous articles: http://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/388682-article-the-mexican-repatriation-process-and-arguments-of-relocation-in-u-s-immigration-hearings-by-robert-kirkland-and-duncan-breda; http://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/389907-article-the-repatriation-process-in-el-salvador-and-arguments-of-relocation-in-u-s-immigration-hearings-by-robert-kirkland-and-duncan-breda; http://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/391682-article-the-repatriation-process-in-honduras-and-arguments-of-relocation-in-u-s-immigration-hearings-by-robert-kirkland
 
 
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Detainee Transfers,” December 2016, accessed at:  https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/7-4.pdf
 
[3] Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda, “The U.S. Criminal History Information Sharing Program and El Salvador’s Decree 717,” May 30, 2018, accessed at: http://discuss.ilw.com/showthread.php?44519-Article-The-U-S-Criminal-History-Information-Sharing-Program-and-El-Salvador%92s-Decree-717-By-Robert-Kirkland-and-Duncan-Breda&highlight=kirkland
 
[4] “The Guatemala National Identity Card,” Entrust Datacard, 2013, accessed at:  https://www.datacard.com/id/knowledge_center/knowledge_center_detail.jsp?id=repositories/downloads/xml/GOV_SS_GuatemalaNID.xml
 
[5] For information on the Guatemalan driver’s license, see:  http://maycom.com.gt
 
[6]  “Electricity Regulation in Guatemala:  Overview,” Thomson Reuters Practical Law, March 1, 2019, accessed at: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-009-9340?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1; 
 
 
 

Introduction:
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the Honduran repatriation process and how the government tracks its citizens.  In immigration hearings, the U.S. government regularly asserts that respondents who are threatened by gangs can relocate to other areas of Honduras, obtain jobs, and function normally without detection.   However, there are a number of mechanisms the Honduras government uses in order to know where its citizens live.  Given that the Honduran bureaucracy has been compromised by officials under the pay of gangs or been infiltrated by gang members themselves, gangs can use these same databases to track persons of interest and continue to threaten them.   It is highly probable, therefore, that no person can prevent gangs finding out where they live in the long term.
 
 
Repatriation Process:
 
When a Honduran is repatriated, they fall under local repatriation arrangements signed by both U.S. and Honduran government officials designed to strengthen the bilateral framework for the protection of Honduran citizens being returned to Honduras, improve the efficient use of limited resources, and increase coordination during the repatriation process.  Before or during the repatriation, the Department of Homeland Security provides Honduras a list of the persons to be repatriated and pertinent information on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Form I-216. [1]
 
When individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses are being repatriated through formal immigration proceedings, information added includes alias, convictions and dates, and time served.  In addition, Salvadoran officials have web access to the U.S. Criminal History
Information Sharing (CHIS)  which includes  biometric information (photographs and fingerprints). DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) stores fingerprints on behalf of DHS component agencies which can be readily accessed by Honduran authorities.  Note that the CHIS applies to both criminal and non-criminal deportees.  In a previous article, we examined the CHIS in more detail [2].
 
Therefore, when a repatriated citizen is returned, Honduran authorities have a good deal of information on each person.   This data is augmented by several necessary disclosures each returnee must do in order to move throughout the country, hold a job, or drive a vehicle.
 
Identification:
 
Honduran citizens must have some sort of identification.  Recent deportees can carry a U.S. identification such as a state drivers license. Nevertheless, U.S. identification are not accepted for most transactions.  The El Registro Nacional de las Personas, or RNP as it is commonly known,is the most widely used form of identification in Honduras.   It is essentially a voter registration card.  One needs an RNP to open a bank account, to apply for a job, and for employment.   Proof of address is required—a receipt of telephone, electricity, bank, school or other public or private services. The Honduran government plans to create a new RNP in 2020. All Hondurans will have to convert to the new RNP which will add security seals and a chip.   It will also be a way for the Honduran government to obtain up to date addresses and data on all its citizens. [3]

​Driver’s License:
 
Obtaining a driver’s license in Honduras is separate from the application for the RNP. Once approved to drive, the driver is put into a central database to monitor traffic-related activities.  The driver's license must be renewed every year or allowed to renew for a maximum of 5 years. One year costs 150 lempiras up to five years for a cost of 600 lempiras.   Most Hondurans drivers, because of the expense, renew yearly.  Nevertheless, when renewed, a current address must be given. [4]
 
Medical Care:
 
The Honduran Institute of Social Security (IHSS) is the clearinghouse for medical care in Honduras.  All employers who pay taxes must register their workers with the IHSS.  If a person wants to be medically treated by State supported providers, they must be registered by their employer through the IHSS.  If a Honduran is not registered with their employer, they are forced to pay for expensive private health care which gives both employers and employees a strong incentive to opt into the IHSS system.  When the employer registers their employees, they provide names and known addresses of their employees to the IHSS [5].
 
 
Utility Companies:
 
The Honduran national ENEE Empresa de Energia Electrica (recently changed to "EEH" Energia Electrica Honduras), like other utilities such as the telephone company, tracks those who pay for their services.  They have a database of names and addresses of their customers and regularly update their customer lists in order to efficiently collect outstanding payments [6].
 
Conclusion:
 
The point of this article is to show that repatriated Honduran citizens are effectively tracked by their government from documents and CHIS data given to it by U.S. authorities, to registering for national identification, driver licensure, medical insurance and utility usage.   At each point, a residential address must be given.  This information is stored by Honduran authorities which allows them to know the location of each of their citizens.  
 
As noted earlier, during deportation hearings, respondents are regularly asked by the U.S. government about their ability to hide or find employment in other areas of Honduras and thus avoid gang detection.  Unfortunately, Honduran law enforcement and government officials operate under the mandate of take a bribe or take a bullet in regard to gangs.   This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the gangs.  Gangs can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to obtain addresses or other information from persons of interest from government databases.  There are also gang members that are members of the security forces and other government agencies that can compromise these databases. 
 
This leaves repatriated Hondurans who fear gangs having to drop out of society in order to stay safe—meaning having no government identification, the ability to obtain good paying work, operate a motor vehicle, have health insurance or access to utilities such as electricity or telephone.  Thus, for those repatriated Hondurans who want to reintegrate into society and lead normal lives, they leave themselves open to detection from the same gangs they fear.
 
 
Endnotes:
 
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Detainee Transfers,” December 2016, accessed at:  https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/7-4.pdf
 
[2] Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda, “The U.S. Criminal History Information Sharing Program and El Salvador’s Decree 717,” May 30, 2018, accessed at: http://discuss.ilw.com/showthread.php?44519-Article-The-U-S-Criminal-History-Information-Sharing-Program-and-El-Salvador%92s-Decree-717-By-Robert-Kirkland-and-Duncan-Breda&highlight=kirkland
 
[3] See the following sources for information on the RNP in Honduras:  https://notibomba.com/honduras-tarjeta-de-identidad-podra-tramitarse-en-linea/;
http://tramiteshn.com/2017/01/26/como-obtener-la-tarjeta-de-identidad-en-honduras/;
http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/inicio/organizacion/direcciones-generales/direccion-general-de-inspeccion-del-trabajo/requisitos-de-inspecciones-especiales/;
https://honduras.eregulations.org/media/Tarjet%C3%B3n%20completo-1.pdf
 
 
[4] For information on the Honduran driver’s license, see:  http://tramiteshn.com/2017/01/18/como-conseguir-la-licencia-de-conducir-en-honduras/
 
[5]  A summary of the Honduran medical system and IHSS can be found at:  https://honduras.eregulations.org/procedure/39/37/step/118?l=es
https://honduras.eregulations.org/media/Tarjet%C3%B3n%20completo-1.pdf
 
[6] Energia Electrica Honduras, https://www.eeh.hn/es/inicio.html
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

​Introduction:
 
The purpose of this article is examine the Salvadoran repatriation process and how the government tracks its citizens.  In immigration hearings, the U.S. government regularly asserts that respondents who are threatened by gangs can relocate to other areas of El Salvador, obtain jobs, and function normally without detection.   However, there are a number of mechanisms the Salvadoran government uses in order to know where its citizens live.  Given that the Salvadoran bureaucracy has been compromised by officials under the pay of gangs or been infiltrated by gang members themselves, gangs can use these same databases to track persons of interest and continue to threaten them.   It is highly probable, therefore, that no person can prevent gangs finding out where they live in the long term.
 
 
Repatriation Process:
 
When a Salvadoran is repatriated, they fall under local repatriation arrangements signed by both U.S. and Salvadoran government officials designed to strengthen the bilateral framework for the protection of Salvadoran citizens being returned to El Salvador, improve the efficient use of limited resources, and increase coordination during the repatriation process.  Before or during the repatriation, the Department of Homeland Security provides El Salvador a list of the persons to be repatriated and pertinent information on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Form I-216. [1]
 
When individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses are being repatriated through formal immigration proceedings, information added includes alias, convictions and dates, and time served.  In addition, Salvadoran officials have web access to the U.S. Criminal History
Information Sharing (CHIS)  which includes  biometric information (photographs and fingerprints). DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) stores fingerprints on behalf of DHS component agencies which can be readily accessed by Salvadoran authorities. Note that the CHIS applies to both criminal and non-criminaldeportees.  In a previous article, we examined the CHIS in more detail [2].
 
Therefore, when a repatriated citizen is returned, Salvadoran authorities have a good deal of information on each person.   This data is augmented by several necessary disclosures each returnee must do in order to move throughout the country, hold a job, or drive a vehicle.
 
Identification:
 
Salvadoran citizens must have some sort of identification. Recent deportees can carry a U.S. identification such as a state drivers license. Nevertheless, U.S. identification are not accepted for most transactions.  TheDocumento Único de Identidad, or DUI as it is commonly known,is the most widely used form of identification in El Salvador.   It is essentially a voter registration card. One needs a Documento Único de Identidadto open a bank account, to apply for a job, and for employment.   Proof of address is required—a receipt of telephone, electricity, bank, school or other public or private services. [3]
 
 
Driver’s License:
 
Obtaining a driver’s license in El Salvador is separate from the DUI application. Once approved to drive, the driver is put into a central database to monitor traffic-related activities.   This information is shared by the Salvadoran Departments of Interior, Transport and Finance.   All drivers are issued a license the size of a credit card with embedded software. Data includes identity, vehicle registration status, type of license, vehicle tax data and history of traffic violations as well as biometric information. [4]
 
 
Conclusion:
 
The point of this article is to show that repatriated Salvadoran citizens are effectively tracked by their government from documents and CHIS data given to it by U.S. authorities, to registering for national identification and driver licensure.   At each point, a residential address must be given.  This information is stored by Salvadoran authorities which allows them to know the location of each of their citizens.
 
As noted earlier, during deportation hearings, respondents are regularly asked by the U.S. government about their ability to hide or find employment in other areas of El Salvador and thus avoid gang detection.  Unfortunately, Salvadoran law enforcement and government officials operate under the mandate of take a bribe or take a bullet in regard to gangs.   This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the gangs.  Gangs can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to obtain addresses or other information from persons of interest from government databases. There are also gang members that are members of the security forces and other government agencies that can compromise these databases. 
 
This leaves repatriated Salvadorans who fear gangs having to drop out of society in order to stay safe—meaning having no government identification, the ability to obtain good paying work, operate a motor vehicle, or access other essential public services. Thus, for those repatriated Salvadorans who want to reintegrate into society and lead normal lives, they leave themselves open to detection from the same gangs they fear.
 
 
Endnotes:
 
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Detainee Transfers,” December 2016, accessed at:  https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/7-4.pdf
 
[2] Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda, “The U.S. Criminal History Information Sharing Program and El Salvador’s Decree 717,” May 30, 2018, accessed at: http://discuss.ilw.com/showthread.php?44519-Article-The-U-S-Criminal-History-Information-Sharing-Program-and-El-Salvador%92s-Decree-717-By-Robert-Kirkland-and-Duncan-Breda&highlight=kirkland
 
[3] DUI El Salvador,” Government of El Salvador, Accessed at:  http://www.dui.gob.sv
[4] El Salvador’s Smart Driver’s License and Vehicle Registration Card,”  Genmalto Corporation, Accessed at:  https://www.gemalto.com/brochures-site/download-site/Documents/gov-el-salvador.pdf
 

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Interpol Red Notice process and its potential for abuse by Mexican and Central American authorities under the influence of drug cartels or gangs.  There is evidence that cartels and gangs have used the Interpol Red Notice system to falsely arrest persons of interest in the United States, ultimately having them removed by the U.S. immigration system back to their country of origin.  Once repatriated, these person become targets of retribution by cartels and gangs.  The abuse of the Red Notices system has been highlighted recently in the cases of Azerbaijan, China, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela—all authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian governments who use the Interpol system to punish political dissidents. Less noted or discussed are these Central American and Mexican cases where the law enforcement arm has been infiltrated by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) such as cartels and gangs.  Here the abuse of the Red Notice system is as much a concern as in China or Russia.
What are Interpol Red Notices?
Interpol Red Notices are international warrants for deportation and prosecution for crimes committed within another country which has bilateral extradition treaties between that country and the country in which the fugitive resides. Essentially a Red Notice lets one country signal to all other Interpol members (every country except North Korea) that it wants a person arrested with an eye to extradition. The Red Notice is not an arrest warrant—police forces do not have to obey it—but based on the types of crimes either suspected of or committed by the wanted fugitive, police have the prerogative to detain and extradite the fugitive. The originating country provides information to Interpol’s General Secretariat which evaluates the information provided by the originating country and conducts a compliance check.  Using Interpol’s criteria of “justifiable necessity,” it issues the warrant to police forces around the world to request to apprehend and extradite the wanted fugitive [1]. 
Potential for Abuse
The use of Interpol Red Notices have skyrocketed since 2009 when the checks and balances on notices were eased-- increasing the likelihood that some of these notices are being issued in bad faith. Ted Bromund, an expert on Interpol, states that Interpol has far more notices than it can realistically vet, that abuse is rife and is “the equivalent of Genghis Khan with a telegraph.” [2] 
Law enforcement and government officials in Mexico and Central America operate under the mandate of “silver or lead” (plata o plomo) -- basically take a bribe or take a bullet in regards to TCOs. This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the TCOs. Cartel bribes often times greatly exceed monthly salaries. Thus, TCOs can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to conduct a variety of law enforcement actions to include issuing bad faith Interpol Red Notices for arrest and extradition of persons of interest.  In effect, this gives TCOs ability to extend their power to threaten with arrest and removal persons of interest well beyond their home country.
 Conclusion
In the vast majority of cases, Interpol Red Notices serve an important role in detaining and extraditing wanted criminals back to their country of origin.  Nevertheless, there is also great potential for abuse of Interpol Red Notices and a review of Red Notice procedure has yet to be adopted.   There is justifiable concern that the Red Notice system is being abused by Mexico and Central American countries under the influence of TCOs to arbitrarily arrest and deport Mexican and Central American nationals residing in the United States. Mexican and Central Americans flee their home countries (often to the United States) in order to escape drug cartel or gang threats.  With the Interpol Red Notice, TCOs have a potent weapon to threaten persons of interest with arrests and removals well beyond their home country.
References
[1] “18 U.S. Code § 3181 - Scope and Limitation of Chapter.” LII / Legal Information Institute, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3181; “Red Notices.” Types of Human Trafficking / Trafficking in Human Beings / Crime Areas / Internet / Home - INTERPOL, www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Notices/Red-Notices.
[2]  “Russia’s latest attempt to arrest Bill Browder shows how autocracies abuse Interpol,”  Quartz, October 27, 2017.  Accessed at: https://qz.com/1112864/russia-and-bill-browder-how-autocracies-abuse-interpol/
See also: Goldstein, Joseph, and Benjamin Weiser. “After 78 Killings, a Honduran Drug Lord Partners With the U.S.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Oct. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/world/americas/after-78-killings-a-honduran-drug-lord-rivera-partners-with-us.html.

Introduction:

The purpose of this article is examine the Mexican repatriation process and how the government tracks its citizens. In immigration hearings, the U.S. government regularly asserts that respondents who are threatened by cartels can relocate to other areas of Mexico, obtain jobs, and function normally without detection.   However, there are a number of mechanisms the Mexican government uses in order to know where its citizens live.  Given that the Mexican bureaucracy has been compromised by officials under the pay of drug cartels, cartels can use these same databases to track persons of interest and continue to threaten them.   It is highly probable, therefore, that no person can prevent drug cartels finding out where they live in the long term.

Repatriation Process:

When a Mexican is repatriated, they fall under local repatriation arrangements signed by both U.S. and Mexican government officials designed to strengthen the bilateral framework for the protection of Mexican citizens being returned to Mexico, improve the efficient use of limited resources, and increase coordination during the repatriation process.  Before or during the repatriation, the Department of Homeland Security provides the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) a list of the persons to be repatriated and pertinent on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Form I-216 [1].

When individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses are being repatriated through formal immigration proceedings, information added includes alias, convictions and dates, and time served.  In addition, the INM has web access to the U.S. Criminal HistoryInformation Sharing (CHIS)  which includes  biometric information (photographs and fingerprints). DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) stores fingerprints on behalf of DHS component agencies which can be readily accessed by Mexican authorities.   In a previous article, we examined the CHIS in more detail [2].

Therefore, when a repatriated citizen is returned, Mexican authorities have a good deal of information on each person.   This data is augmented by several necessary disclosures each returnee must do in order to move throughout the country, hold a job, or have access to national health insurance.   

Identification:
Mexican citizens must have some sort of identification.  Police can jail persons who do not have identification. Recent deportees can carry a U.S. identification such as a state drivers license. The Matrícula Consular is given by Mexican consulates in the U.S. but is not recognized as an official identification.  Those without either can go to a local governmental office to request a Carta de Residencia which serves as a temporary identification.  

Nevertheless, U.S. identification or temporary Mexican ones are not accepted for most transactions.  The Credencial de Elector del Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) is the most widely used form of identification in Mexico.   It is issued by the IFE – the Instituto Federal de Eleciones and is essentially a voter registration card. One needs a Credencial de Elector to open a bank account, to apply for a job, and for employment.   Proof of address within three months as required—a receipt of telephone, electricity, bank, school or other public or private services.  If a person’s address changes, this must be updated with the IFE [3].

Driver’s License:

Obtaining a driver’s license in Mexico is separate from the INE application and is run by the Departamento de Registro y Control Vehicular in each Mexican State.  Applicants must present their Credencial de Elector as well as proof of address: a recent utility bill, phone, property tax or bank statement in the person’s name not older than 90 days.  The license is normally valid for two years and when a person renews, they must provide updated proof of address [4].

Health Insurance-Seguro Popular:

Seguro Popular is the state issued medical service that provides medical and surgical services, as well as pharmaceuticals, hospitalization, and preventive health services. Its main objective is to provide financial protection to the non-insured population, through a scheme of health insurance, public and voluntary.  Almost all repatriated citizens will fall under Seguro Popular until they obtain jobs through a state entity after which they may obtain upgraded health insurance.  In order to access Seguro Popular, an applicant needs to provide the Mexican Secretaría de Salud proof of address of no more than two months old and a birth certificate. This information is required to be updated each time the applicant requests health services [5].

Conclusion:

The point of this article is to show that repatriated Mexican citizens are effectively tracked by their government from documents and CHIS data given to it by U.S. authorities, to registering for national identification, driver licensure, and obtaining basic health care.   At each point, a residential address must be given and updated periodically.   This information is stored by Mexican authorities which allows them to know the location of each of their citizens.

As noted earlier, during deportation hearings, respondents are regularly asked by the U.S. government about their ability to hide or find employment in other areas of Mexico and thus avoid drug cartel detection.  Unfortunately, Mexican law enforcement and government officials operate under the mandate of “silver or lead”-- basically take a bribe or take a bullet in regard to cartels.   This puts good police and government officials in fear of enforcing the law and corrupt ones with increased power that comes from association with the cartels. Two-thirds of local police earn less than $300 per month and the remaining third earn less than $100 per month. Cartel bribes often times greatly exceed monthly salaries.   Thus, cartels can co-opt government or law enforcement officials to obtain addresses or other information from persons of interest from the beforementioned government databases.  

This leaves repatriated Mexicans who fear cartels having to drop out of society in order to stay safe—meaning having no government identification, ability to obtain good paying work, health care and other essential public services. Thus, for those repatriated Mexicans who want to reintegrate into society and lead normal lives, they leave themselves open to detection from the same cartels they fear.

Endnotes:
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Updated U.S.-Mexico Local Repatriation Agreements,” February 26, 2016, accessed at: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/updated-us-mexico-local-repatriation-arrangements
[2] Robert Kirkland and Duncan Breda, “The U.S. Criminal History Information Sharing Program and El Salvador’s Decree 717,” May 30, 2018, accessed at: http://discuss.ilw.com/showthread.php?44519-Article-The-U-S-Criminal-History-Information-Sharing-Program-and-El-Salvador%92s-Decree-717-By-Robert-Kirkland-and-Duncan-Breda&highlight=kirkland
[3] Los Angeles Times, “Mexico supports its ‘migrant heroes’ in the U.S., but ignores them when they are deported,” May 4, 2018, accessed at: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-delano-alonso-mexico-deportees-20180504-story.html; Compounding that problem this year was that anyone returning to Mexico between March and June did not even have the option of obtaining a Credencial de Electorbecause of restrictions imposed during the months before an election. Returnees were forced, in effect, to live "without papers" in their own country; See also Joel Medina, “Life After Deportation,” accessed at:  http://www.survivingpostrelease.org/uploads/1/9/1/2/19121643/_guide_for_deportees_to_mexico.pdf
[4] See for example requirements for Mexico City:  http://www.cdmx.gob.mx
[5] Mexican Secretaría de Salud, “Seguro Popular,” accessed at:  http://www.seguropopular.org

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